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Abstract
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public
good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an
incomplete contracting framework with split-the-di¤erence bargaining, Besley
and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most
should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the
split-the-di¤erence rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our nding
is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and
Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially
depends on whether the split-the-di¤erence rule or the deal-me-out solution is
used.
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Should governments or private organizations be the owners of public projects?
This question might be one of the most fundamental problems in economics.
As has been emphasized in a seminal paper by Besley and Ghatak (2001),
many states now delegate the responsibility for providing public goods to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).1 The question then naturally arises:
Should the state maintain ownership, or should the NGO become the owner,
in particular when the NGO is also the key investor?
Our analysis of the optimal ownership structure is rooted in the property
rights approach based on incomplete contracting (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), which has become the leading paradigm
in the modern theory of the rm.2 In a nutshell, the simplest version of
the basic property rights model works as follows. Consider two parties who
can generate a surplus when they collaborate tomorrow. If the parties will
not agree on collaboration, the party who owns the relevant assets will still
be able to generate a surplus, albeit smaller than the collaboration surplus.
Suppose that today one of the two parties has to make an important investment
decision. The central result of the property rights theory is that this party
should be the owner. The reason is that tomorrow the parties will agree to
collaborate and divide the collaboration surplus according to the split-the-
di¤erence rule. Hence, each party gets its disagreement payo¤ plus half of the
additional surplus that is generated by collaboration. Ownership thus increases
the share of the total surplus that a party will get tomorrow, so the investing
party should be the owner in order to improve its incentives to invest.
In the present paper, we further broaden the property rights approach by
1See also the recent books by Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011), Grimsey and Lewis (2004),
and Yescombe (2011) for numerous practical examples.
2Hart (2011) describes in a very concise way the state of the art of the theory of the rm.
See also Segal and Whinston (2013) for a comprehensive survey of the related literature.
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bringing together two important variants of the basic incomplete contracting
model (see Table 1).
First, Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998) have shown that
the conclusions of the basic property rights model crucially rely on whether
the ex post negotiations between the parties are modelled using the split-the-
di¤erence rule or the deal-me-out solution.3 According to the deal-me-out
solution, each party gets half of the collaboration surplus, except when one
partys disagreement payo¤ is larger than half of the collaboration surplus.
In the latter case, the party with the large disagreement payo¤ gets its dis-
agreement payo¤, while the other party is residual claimant. If the bargaining
solution is given by the deal-me-out rule, then it may be optimal to make the
non-investing party the owner of the relevant assets, which is never the case in
the standard property rights model.4 In particular, if the non-investing party
is the owner, then the investing party can become residual claimant, so it may
even have rst-best investment incentives.
Second, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have applied the property rights ap-
proach to a public goods setting.5 In this setting, even the non-owner gets a
surplus in case of disagreement, since the owner provides a public good. Besley
and Ghatak (2001) follow the standard property rights approach in assuming
that the bargaining outcome is given by the split-the-di¤erence rule. It turns
3We follow the wording of Binmore et al. (1989), which is also used by De Meza and
Lockwood (1998).
4Giving ownership to a non-investing party may also be optimal in property rights models
in which the investing party has private information about its disagreement payo¤ (see
Schmitz, 2006, and Goldlücke and Schmitz, 2014).
5For variants of Besley and Ghataks (2001) model, see e.g. Halonen-Akatwijuka and
Palis (2009 and 2014) on repeated games and location choice, Grosjean (2010) on main-
tenance costs, Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) on impure public goods, and Halonen-
Akatwijuka (2012) on indispensable agents. On optimal ownership structures in models
where the private party does not directly care about the public good, see also Hart et
al. (1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010).
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out that in Besley and Ghataks (2001) model the party who has a larger val-
uation of the public good should always be the owner, even when the other
party is the key investor.
private goods public goods
split-the-di¤erence Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) Besley and Ghatak (2001)
deal-me-out Chiu (1998), De Meza and Lockwood (1998) this paper
Table 1. Relation to the literature.
The goal of the present contribution is to investigate whether Besley and
Ghataks (2001) important insights are robust when the split-the-di¤erence
rule is replaced by the deal-me-out rule. Is it still true that the party who
values the public good most should always be the owner, or does the optimal
ownership structure crucially depend on whether the split-the-di¤erence rule
or the deal-me-out solution is applied, as it is the case in a private goods frame-
work? Moreover, may the deal-me-out solution even yield rst-best investment
incentives for a party as in the case of private goods?
These questions are important, since the deal-me-out solution may be at
least as plausible as the split-the-di¤erence rule.6 In laboratory experiments,
the deal-me-out solution predicts well, as has been emphasized by Binmore et
al. (1989, 1991). Both rules may be appealing as fairness norms. Moreover,
Binmore et al. (1991) point out that what people perceive as fair may actually
be inuenced by strategic considerations. There are indeed convincing non-
cooperative bargaining games in support of each of the two sharing rules. For
6Moreover, the questions are also interesting as De Meza and Lockwood (2004) have
shown that even in the case of the deal-me-out solution the investing party should always be
the owner when there are su¢ ciently strong spillovers in a private good setting. One might
hence suspect that this result carries over to the case of public goods. Yet, we will show
that this is not the case.
4
instance, in Chiu and Yangs (1999) innite horizon bargaining game, the
choice between the two approaches depends on the length of time that taking
an outside option restricts a party from reverting to collaboration with the
other party.7
We nd that Besley and Ghataks (2001) central insights are indeed ro-
bust when we replace the split-the di¤erence rule by the deal-me-out solution.
Specically, we focus on the case in which the NGO is the key investor. Due
to the public-good nature of the project, the party who cares more about the
project has by denition a larger disagreement payo¤. Thus, only the high-
valuation partys outside option may be binding in the deal-me-out solution.
Suppose rst that the NGO cares more about the public good. When the
NGOs outside option is binding, the NGOs investment incentives are maxi-
mized if the NGO is the owner (since in the case of disagreement the NGO is
in a better position to make use of its own investment than the government).
Now suppose the government cares more about the public good. When the
governments outside option is binding, the NGO is residual claimant. In this
case, the NGOs incentives are maximized if the NGOs investment has only a
minimal e¤ect on the governments outside option, so the government should
be the owner. The latter nding is in stark contrast to the standard prop-
erty rights model and thus strengthens the conclusions of Besley and Ghatak
(2001).
Finally, in contrast to the private goods framework, we nd that even when
the NGO is residual claimant due to the deal-me-out rule, it does not have rst-
best investment incentives, because in the case of public goods by investing
the NGO also increases the governments disagreement payo¤.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
7See also Muthoo (1999), who provides comprehensive discussions of non-cooperative
bargaining games with alternating o¤ers that may lead to the split-the-di¤erence or the
deal-me-out division.
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we introduce the formal model. In Section 3, we briey consider the split-the-
di¤erence rule, while our main results regarding the deal-me-out solution are
derived in Section 4. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2 The model
There are two parties, G (the government) and N (a non-governmental or-
ganization, NGO). At an initial date 0, the parties agree on an ownership
structure o 2 fG;Ng. At date 1, the NGO chooses an observable but non-
contractible investment level i  0. In line with the incomplete contracting
approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), it
is assumed that ex ante it is not possible to write a contract that species ex
post collaboration of the parties.8
At date 2, the parties can write a contract specifying collaboration to pro-
vide a public good. If the two parties agree to collaborate, they together
provide the quantity y(i) of the public good, where y(0) = 0, y0(0) = 1,
y0(1) = 0, and y00 < 0. If the parties do not collaborate at date 2, the pro-
vided quantity of the public good depends on the ownership structure. In
particular, in case of disagreement the quantity of the public good is Ny(i) if
o = N and Gy(i) if o = G, where 0 < G < N  1. Note that collaboration
is always ex post e¢ cient. Moreover, since the NGO is the investing party, in
case of disagreement a larger fraction of the NGOs investments can be used
when the NGO is the owner.
Let the governments valuation of the public good be denoted by G > 0,
while the non-governmental organizations valuation is denoted by N > 0.
Thus, the parties payo¤s are as depicted in Table 2, where t is a transfer
payment from the government to the NGO.
8For detailed discussions of the incomplete contracting paradigm, see Hart and Moore
(1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Tirole (1999).
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payo¤ of party G payo¤ of party N
collaboration Gy(i)  t Ny(i) + t
default, o = G GGy(i) NGy(i)
default, o = N GNy(i) NNy(i)
Table 2. The partiespayo¤s.
The rst best-benchmark. Note that the total surplus (G+N)y(i)  i
is maximized by the investment level iFB, which is implicitly characterized by
the rst-order condition (G + N)y0(iFB) = 1.
3 Split-the-di¤erence
Besley and Ghatak (2001) follow the standard property rights approach and
apply the split-the-di¤erence rule to model the date-2 negotiations. Hence,
under ownership structure o 2 fG;Ng, at date 2 the parties agree on a trans-
fer payment t such that each party gets its default payo¤ plus half of the
renegotiation surplus (G + N)y(i)  (G + N)oy(i).





(G + N)(1  o)y(i)  i.




(G + N)(1  o)y(i).
As a consequence, at date 1 the NGO chooses the investment level io, which
is implicitly characterized by
1
2
[G + N + o(N   G)]y0(io) = 1:
Note that there is always underinvestment compared to the rst-best solu-
tion, because the NGOs marginal return 1
2
[G + N + o(N   G)] is smaller
7
than the social marginal return G + N . Moreover, observe that iG  iN
whenever G  N , because
1
2
[G + N + G(N   G)]  1
2
[G + N + N(N   G)]
() 0  (N   G)(N   G)
() G  N :
Due to concavity of the total surplus, this means that it is always optimal
for the party who has a larger valuation of the public good to be the owner.
In particular, even though the NGO is the investing party, ownership by the
government can be optimal, which is in contrast to the standard property rights
theory with private goods.9 Intuitively, when party G has a larger valuation
of the public good, then Ns investment improves the default payo¤ and thus
the bargaining position of party G more than its own bargaining position, so
making party G the owner is optimal as this reduces the impact of the default
payo¤s on the bargaining outcome.
4 Deal-me-out
We now explore whether Besley and Ghataks (2001) central insight is robust
when we replace the split-the-di¤erence rule by the deal-me-out solution.
Thus, we now suppose that at date 2 the parties split the collaboration
surplus (G + N)y(i) equally, except when one partys default payo¤ is larger
than half of the collaboration surplus.10 If party Gs default payo¤ Goy(i) is
9Schmitz (2013) has shown that when the regular Nash bargaining solution is replaced by
the generalized Nash bargaining solution (i.e., if the renegotiation surplus is split unequally),
then Besley and Ghataks (2001) result that the party who values the public good most
should always be the owner no longer holds. Yet, it is still true that only the relationship
between G and N matters for the optimal ownership structure, while the investment
technology is irrelevant (i.e., in contrast to the private good case, N -ownership is not always
optimal, even though only party N has to make a relevant investment decision).




(G + N)y(i), then party G gets its default payo¤ Goy(i) and
party N is residual claimant, i.e. it gets (G+N)y(i) Goy(i). Analogously,
if party Ns default payo¤ Noy(i) is larger than 12(G + N)y(i), then party
N gets Noy(i) and party G gets (G + N)y(i)  Noy(i).
Hence, given ownership structure o 2 fG;Ng, the NGOs ex ante payo¤ is
given by




(G + N)y(i)  i if maxfNo; Gog  12(G + N);
Noy(i)  i if Go < 12(G + N) < No;
(G + N)y(i)  Goy(i)  i if No < 12(G + N) < Go;
and the governments payo¤ is given by




(G + N)y(i) if maxfNo; Gog  12(G + N);
(G + N)y(i)  Noy(i) if Go < 12(G + N) < No;
Goy(i) if No < 12(G + N) < Go:
We can now analyze the NGOs investment decision at date 1.
Suppose rst that G  N . In this case, the NGO maximizes




(G + N)y(i)  i if Go  12(G + N);
(G + N)y(i)  Goy(i)  i if 12(G + N) < Go:








[(1  o)G + N ]y0(io) = 1 if o > 1
2
(1 + N=G):








(1 + N=G), then o = G is the optimal ownership structure, since
(1  N)G + N < (1  G)G + N < G + N :
collaboration surplus, because the sum of the default payo¤s Goy(i) + Noy(i) cannot
be larger than the collaboration surplus (G + N )y(i).
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Note that there is always underinvestment with regard to the rst-best bench-
mark, so concavity of the total surplus implies that the ownership structure
that leads to the larger investment level is optimal. Finally, o = G is also
optimal if G  12(1 + N=G) < N , because in this case
(1  N)G + N < 1
2
(G + N) < G + N
holds.
Recall that in the case of the split-the-di¤erence rule, when G  N , then
the investment level is characterized by 1
2
[G + N + G(N   G)]y0(iG) = 1.
Note that the investment level is larger in the case of the deal-me-out solution,
because both 1
2
(G + N) and (1   G)G + N are larger than 12 [G + N +
G(N   G)].
Suppose next that G < N , so the NGO maximizes




(G + N)y(i)  i if No  12(G + N);
Noy(i)  i if 12(G + N) < No:

















0(io) = 1 regardless of the ownership structure. If G > 12(1 +
G=N), then o = N is the optimal ownership structure, because
NG < NN < G + N :
Finally, if G  12(1 + G=N) < N , then again o = N is optimal, since
1
2
(G + N) < NN < G + N :
In the case of the split-the-di¤erence rule, if G < N , then the investment
level is implicitly given by 1
2
[G + N + N(N   G)]y0(iN) = 1. Note that
10
the investment level is smaller in the case of the deal-me-out solution, because
both 1
2
(G + N) and NN are smaller than 12 [G + N + N(N   G)].
To summarize, the following results hold.
Proposition 1 Suppose the outcome of the date-2 negotiations is given by the
deal-me-out solution.
(i) It is always optimal to let the party who values the public good most be
the owner.
(ii) The NGOs investment level is larger than in the case of the split-
the-di¤erence rule if ownership by the government is optimal. Otherwise, the
investment level is smaller than in the case of the split-the-di¤erence rule.
(iii) The investment level is always strictly smaller than the rst-best bench-
mark.
Intuitively, suppose rst that party Gs valuation G is smaller than party
Ns valuation N . Observe that in this case it can never happen that party
Gs outside option will be binding. If the NGOs outside option is binding,
it gets its default payo¤, so the NGO should be the owner, since then the
NGOs default payo¤ is larger than when party G is the owner. If the NGOs
outside option is not binding, each party gets half of the collaboration surplus
regardless of the ownership structure, so it does not matter who is the owner.
The investment level is smaller than in the split-the-di¤erence scenario, where
the NGO got more than half of the surplus when N was larger than G.
Next, suppose that party G has the larger valuation. In this case it can
never happen that party Ns outside option will be binding. If party Gs
outside option is binding, then the NGO is residual claimant, so its invest-
ment incentives are improved when party Gs default payo¤ is made smaller,
i.e. party G should be the owner. When party Gs outside option is not bind-
ing, each party gets again half of the collaboration surplus, so the ownership
structure does not matter. The investment level is larger than in the split-the-
di¤erence scenario, where the NGO got less than half of the surplus when G
11
was larger than N .
Finally, note that due to the public good nature of the project, even when
the NGO is residual claimant it does not have rst-best investment incentives,
because by investing it also increases party Gs default payo¤.
5 Conclusions
Besley and Ghatak (2001) have shown that in the case of public goods, own-
ership should reside with the party that cares most about the project, even if
the other party is the key investor. However, their model might be considered
to be restrictive in the sense that the outcome of the partiesnegotiations was
given by the split-the-di¤erence rule.
In this paper, we have shown that Besley and Ghataks (2001) central
insight is indeed robust when the split-the-di¤erence rule is replaced by the
deal-me-out solution.11 Our nding thus highlights another important di¤er-
ence between the public good and the private good settings, as Chiu (1998)
and De Meza and Lockwood (1998) have shown that the central insights of the
property rights theory are not robust with regard to the deal-me-out solution
in the case of private goods. Moreover, it has turned out that in contrast to
the case of private goods, with public goods it is not possible to provide rst-
best investment incentives, even when the bargaining outcome is given by the
deal-me-out solution.
11We have focused on the case of one-sided investments, which means that the technologi-
cal asymmetry between the parties is as large as possible (so in the case of private goods the
investing party should always be the owner), which is the most challenging case for Besley
and Ghataks (2001) ndings. It can be shown that also in the more symmetric setting with
two-sided investments Besley and Ghataks (2001) central insight remains valid. Intuitively,
the reason is again that the default payo¤ is always larger for the high-valuation party. Yet,




I have benetted from very helpful discussions with Eva Hoppe.
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